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NOTE
Examining the Impact of In re Brunetti on §
2(a) of the Lanham Act
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Iancu v.
Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019 WL 98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem.)
Alex Weidner *

I. INTRODUCTION
For § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 1 2017 proved to be a devastating year. Not
only did the Matal v. Tam decision strike down the disparagement provision, 2
it served as a springboard for In re Brunetti to invalidate the bar against immoral and scandalous marks later that year. 3 This Note examines whether the
majority correctly invalidated the immoral-scandalous provision, argues that it
did not, and analyzes the likelihood the remaining two provisions in the Lanham Act will be struck down by another First Amendment challenge.
Part II summarizes the facts and holding of In re Brunetti. Part III provides an overview of trademarks and examines the intersection of free speech
with trademark law. Part IV analyzes the reasoning behind the Court’s holding.
Part V argues the majority was hasty in invalidating the immoral-scandalous
bar completely and the concurring opinion was correct in suggesting a narrow
construction of the statute that bars only the registration of obscene marks. It
also examines what remains of § 2(a) and argues the remainder of the statute
is safe from First Amendment challenge.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Erik Brunetti (“Brunetti”), an artist and entrepreneur responsible for
“popularizing ‘streetwear’ having revolutionary themes, proudly subversive
graphics[,] and in-your-face imagery,” filed an application at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) seeking protection for the mark

*
B.S., University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2019; Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018-2019. I am grateful
to Professor Lietzan for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this
Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018), declared unconstitutional by In re Brunetti, 877
F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019
WL 98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem.).
2. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
3. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357.
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FUCT 4 to use as the brand name for a line of clothing. 5 The Trademark Examining Attorney (“Examiner”) issued an office action rejecting the application on the grounds that the application contained immoral or scandalous matter, which was prohibited by § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. 6
The Examiner argued FUCT was the “phonetic equivalent” of “fucked,”
which was vulgar and therefore immoral or scandalous. 7 In his reply to the
office action, Brunetti provided evidence demonstrating that FUCT referenced
a clothing brand and that “the public [did] not perceive [FUCT] as vulgar.” 8
Despite this evidence, a final refusal was issued by the Examiner. 9 Brunetti
sought reconsideration of the matter, but it was similarly denied. 10 Brunetti
appealed the decision to the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (“TTAB”). 11
The TTAB affirmed the Examiner’s rejection, 12 concluding FUCT was
chosen by Brunetti because it provided plausible deniability about whether it
was “merely another way to say ‘fucked’” while not fooling its target audience. 13 The TTAB found FUCT was the functional equivalent of “fucked,”
and the sole question it addressed was whether “fucked” was a scandalous
term. 14 In making the determination, the TTAB examined both the traditional
dictionary definition of “fucked” 15 and the Urban Dictionary definition of
4. To assist the reader with differentiating trademarks from the rest of the text,
all marks are capitalized.
5. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. 2014); Brief for Applicant-Appellant Erik Brunetti at 3, In re Brunetti, 2015 WL 514695 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
6. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1.
7. Id. In his argument, the Examiner cited the first definition that appears on
Urban Dictionary, id. at *3, which defines the word “fuct” as the following:
The past tense of the verb fuck. Also used to express a general state of incapability.
We are so fuct!
She fuct me like a dog in heat!
That’s fuct up!
(Rural definition) Hey maw, I just fuct yer best frind.

URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=fuct (last
visited Oct. 18, 2018).
8. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
12. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *6.
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id. at *5.
15. Id. at *3. The TTAB cited macmillandictionary.com’s definition of fucked,
which was:
Fuck Vulgar Slang
v. fucked, fuck•ing, fucks
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FUCT. 16 Because “fucked” was associated with “decidedly-negative sexual
connotations, . . . extreme misogyny, depravity, violence, intolerance, anger,
and imagery of being ‘doomed’ or a ‘loser,’” the TTAB deemed both FUCT
and “fucked” to be scandalous terms barred from registration by § 2(a) of the
Lanham Act. 17 It affirmed the Examiner’s refusal to register the mark. 18
Brunetti appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which reversed the TTAB and held “the bar in § 2(a) against immoral or scandalous marks [was] unconstitutional because it violat[ed] the [F]irst [A]mendment.” 19

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In re Brunetti deals extensively with both trademark law and First
Amendment jurisprudence. To gain a better understanding of the legal background of the court’s decision, Section A of this Part provides an overview of
First Amendment law, focusing on the types of scrutiny associated with certain
forms of speech. Section B then explores the interaction of First Amendment
and trademark law.

A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .” 20 At first blush, the First Amendment appears to
be a sweeping prohibition, but it is not given its literal meaning. 21 The free
speech clause offers varying levels of protection for different types of private
speech 22 and does not regulate government speech at all. 23 A substantial body
of First Amendment jurisprudence has developed over the last century, and

v.tr.
1. To have sexual intercourse with.
2. To take advantage of, betray, or cheat; victimize.
3. Used in the imperative as a signal of angry dismissal.
v.intr.
1. To engage in sexual intercourse.
2. To act wastefully or foolishly.
3. To interfere; meddle. Often used with with.

Id.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See URBAN DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *4, *6.
Id. at *6.
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom.
Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019 WL 98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem.).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See generally In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1330.
22. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
23. Id.
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three strands of jurisprudence are relevant here. First, differing levels of scrutiny are applied to restrictions on private speech based on whether the speech
is expressive, 24 commercial, 25 or obscene. 26 Second, when the government
creates a forum for speech, restrictions on speech depend upon the nature of
the forum created. 27 Third, although Congress holds the power of the purse, 28
it may not fund private programs or activities in a way that unconstitutionally
burdens one’s rights. 29

1. Categories of Private Speech
Generally, private speech is speech that is associated with a private individual or entity rather than a government. 30 There are many forms of private
speech, with different rules governing each type. 31 Government restrictions on
expressive speech are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny if
they are content-based. 32 Such restrictions will be upheld only if the government can show “that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” 33
Commercial speech is “solely related to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience.” 34 The First Amendment “protects commercial
speech from unwarranted governmental regulation,” 35 but the United States
Supreme Court has recognized a “‘commonsense distinction’” between commercial and other varieties of speech. 36 Restrictions on commercial speech
may be subject to intermediate scrutiny, 37 which means that the restrictions are
constitutional “‘so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1359.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1345–46.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205,
214 (2013) (second alteration in original) (“[The Court has] held that the Government
‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protect
. . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.’”); see also Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 207 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
31. See sources cited supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
32. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1342.
33. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015)).
34. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
35. Id. (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976)).
36. Id. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 455–56
(1978)).
37. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1350.
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the[ir] purpose . . . .’” 38 Thus, “The protection available for particular commercial expression turn on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.” 39
Finally, the Court has recognized that “the unconditional phrasing of the
First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance,” and there are
forms of private speech that are not protected by the First Amendment. 40 Obscenity and fighting words are two common examples of speech that are not
entitled to First Amendment protection. 41

2. Forum Analysis
When restrictions are placed on individuals speaking on government
property, the Court’s method of “forum analysis” is applied, which “determine[s] when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may
place limitations on speech.” 42 The most common locations where forums exist are “venues that are owned and controlled by government entities.” 43 Some
cases, however, have found forums to exist “more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense” so long as the forum is still connected to government property. 44 In each of these forums, viewpoint-based discrimination is
presumed to be unconstitutional. 45 The forums differ, however, as to the level
of scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions. 46
The Court has stated there are three types of forums. 47 Traditional public
forums, “such as streets and parks,” are places that exist to be used by the public for communication and discussion between citizens. 48 Similarly, designated public forums are places that are traditionally not used as a public forum

38. Id. at 1346 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
39. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563.
40. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
41. See, e.g., id. at 485 (obscenity); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288
(2008) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting
words).
42. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1345 (alteration in original) (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669
(2010)).
43. Id. at 1346.
44. Id. at 1347 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 830 (1995)). In Rosenberger, the Court found that a student activity fund was a
limited public forum even though it was metaphysical because the effects of the fund
affected the university, which was government property. Id.
45. Id. at 1346.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1345–46.
48. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
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but have been opened up for that purpose. 49 Strict scrutiny applies to government-imposed, content-based speech restrictions in both of these forums. 50
Limited public forums “are places the government has ‘limited to use by certain
groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.’” 51 In a limited
public forum, content-based restrictions are subjected to intermediate scrutiny
as opposed to strict scrutiny. 52

3. Funding Restrictions
Within the context of Congress’ spending power, 53 the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine has been developed to address how the spending power and
First Amendment interact. 54 The Constitution grants Congress the power to
fund state or private activities and attach requirements to that funding. 55 If an
organization disagrees with the conditions Congress has attached to the funding, the typical remedy is to not accept the funding. 56 The United States Supreme Court has found, however, that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
applies if funding conditions create an “unconstitutional burden” on an individual’s rights. 57 The Court has stated there is a constitutional line between
apparent restrictions on speech that merely define the boundaries of a government program and those that seek to regulate speech. 58
Several cases have examined where exactly the constitutional line lies. In
Rust v. Sullivan, 59 the Court upheld a Title X restriction preventing federal
funding from being used in programs where abortion was a method of family
planning because the restriction only affected Title X programs and did not
prevent other, separate programs from providing abortions so long as federal
funds were not used. 60 Because the requirement merely operated within the

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009)).
See id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985)).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
54. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760–61 (2017) (“[W]e have held that the
Government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protect . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”).
55. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213
(2013).
56. Id. at 214.
57. Id. at 214–25.
58. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Agency for Int’l
Dev., 570 U.S. at 214–15), cert. granted sub nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019
WL 98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem.).
59. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
60. Id. at 202.
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scope of Title X’s program and did not affect the activities of private individuals, it was constitutionally permissible. 61 In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 62 however, the Court
struck down a funding condition of the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (“Leadership Act”) that provided
federal funding for organizations combatting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria because the condition required the organizations to oppose prostitution,
which the Court determined reached outside the scope of the Leadership Act. 63
In essence, a funding condition that restricts speech may be upheld so long as
it does not create an “unconstitutional burden” and is within the scope of the
government program, but it will be struck down if it exceeds the scope of the
program and attempts to regulate the activities of private individuals. The level
of scrutiny for such programs may fluctuate depending on the type of subsidy
program, ranging from intermediate to strict scrutiny. 64

B. Trademarks and the First Amendment
In recent years, courts have grappled with the application of First Amendment principles to the law governing trademark registration. The Lanham Act
defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . [u]sed by a
person . . . [t]o identify and distinguish [their] goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others . . . .” 65 The core function of trademarks is to allow
consumers to distinguish between sources of goods. Courts will enforce a
trademark owner’s right to exclusive use of the trademark within an area of
commerce to protect this source-identifying function. 66
Because common law protections for trademarks exist, they need not be
registered with the federal government to be protectable. 67 Registration, however, offers many advantages. 68 One such advantage is that registration allows
for nationwide protection of a trademark, 69 while unregistered marks may only

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
570 U.S. 205.
Id. at 209–10, 220–21.
See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub
nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019 WL 98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem.).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
66. See id. § 1114.
67. See id. § 1125(a) (granting a civil cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks).
68. See id. § 1114 (granting a civil cause of action for infringement of registered
marks); id. § 1065 (granting incontestability for registered marks in continuous use for
over five years); id. § 1072 (granting constructive notice of ownership upon registration
of a mark).
69. Id. § 1057(c).
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be protectable in the limited area where they are used. 70 The benefits of registration are significant enough that most trademark owners engaging in interstate commerce seek to register their marks, which is accomplished by applying
to the USPTO. 71 There are, however, limits upon what types of marks may be
federally registered. 72 Among other things, § 2(a) precludes the registration of
any mark that is immoral, scandalous, deceptive, or disparaging and any mark
that falsely suggests a connection with a person. 73 In determining whether a
mark may be registered, the USPTO reviews the mark under the standards imposed by the Lanham Act and decides whether it may be registered. 74 By the
terms of § 2(a), the determination requires the USPTO to examine the content
of the mark and thus the content of the speech. 75 This led to the question of
whether § 2(a)’s requirement that the USPTO consider the content of a trademark applicant’s speech violated the First Amendment. 76
In Matal v. Tam, 77 the United States Supreme Court attempted to answer
the question. In Tam, Simon Tam, a member of The Slants, an Asian American
rock group, attempted to register “THE SLANTS” as a trademark. 78 The
USPTO denied the application on the basis of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act because
the Examiner found the mark violated the provision prohibiting “the registration of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or
disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or dead’” because “slants” is a derogatory term
for people of Asian descent. 79 The TTAB affirmed the Examiner, but the Federal Circuit reversed. 80 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the disparagement clause of § 2(a) was invalid under the
First Amendment. 81
The Court upheld the decision of the Federal Circuit, concluding the disparagement clause was unconstitutional because it was in violation of the First
Amendment. 82 The Court found that mere registration was insufficient to

70. See id. § 1115(b)(5). Section 1115(b)(5) protects individuals that used a mark
in a limited geographic area prior to the registration of the same mark by another individual. Id. The unregistered prior user may continue to use the mark but must only use
it within the limited geographic area they operated in prior to the mark being registered.
Id. The owner of the registered mark retains rights to use the mark everywhere else.
See id.
71. Id. § 1051.
72. See id. § 1052.
73. Id. § 1052(a).
74. See id. § 1051.
75. See id. § 1052.
76. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
77. 137 S. Ct. 1744.
78. Id. at 1751, 1754.
79. Id. at 1751 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).
80. Id. at 1754.
81. Id. at 1755.
82. Id. at 1765.
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transform expressive ideas into government speech and trademarks were entitled to First Amendment protection. 83 The Court declined to address whether
trademarks were purely commercial speech or a hybrid of commercial and expressive speech because the disparagement clause could not prevail under the
standard of review associated with either category. 84 To prove this, the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny and found the bar on disparaging trademarks unconstitutional. 85 The Court noted that neither the interest of preventing underrepresented groups from being “‘bombarded with demeaning messages in
commercial advertising’” nor the interest of protecting the “orderly flow of
commerce” was sufficient to withstand intermediate scrutiny and thus the §
2(a) bar on disparaging marks was unconstitutional. 86

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Section A of this Part discusses the majority opinion and examines the
reasoning behind the invalidation of the immoral-scandalous clause. It begins
with the majority’s categorization of trademarks as private speech and then
analyzes the other arguments put forward by the government before concluding
with the majority’s view on the obligation to construe statutes to preserve their
constitutionality. Section B then discusses the concurring opinion.

A. The Majority Opinion
With regard to whether FUCT was scandalous, the Federal Circuit agreed
with the TTAB and the Examiner, concluding that “the [US]PTO may prove
scandalousness by establishing that a mark is ‘vulgar’” 87 and “substantial evidence supports the [TTAB’s] finding the mark FUCT is vulgar.” 88 It also
agreed with the TTAB that FUCT was the “‘phonetic twin’ of ‘fucked’” and
that the connection between the two was “sufficient to render the vulgarity of
the word ‘fuck’ relevant to the vulgarity of [FUCT].” 89 On the basis that
“fucked” was vulgar and therefore scandalous, the Federal Circuit concluded
the rejection was proper unless the immoral-scandalous provision itself violated the First Amendment. 90
The constitutionality analysis for § 2(a) performed by the Federal Circuit
involved analyzing trademark registration in the context of several different
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1760.
See id. at 1764–65.
Id.
Id.
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Fox,
702 F.3d 633 (2012)), cert. granted sub nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18-302, 2019 WL
98541 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2019) (mem.).
88. Id. at 1338–40.
89. Id. at 1338.
90. See id. at 1339–40.
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First Amendment principles. 91 The Court in Tam had already rejected the argument that trademarks were a form of government speech, 92 leaving the Federal Circuit with the task of determining what category of private speech trademarks fell into. 93 It also considered whether the provision should be analyzed
under the limited public forum or government subsidy doctrines. 94 The Federal
Circuit then applied the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the provision. 95 If the provision was deemed unconstitutional, then
the court had to consider whether there was any reasonable interpretation that
could prevent the provision from being unconstitutional. 96 If no such interpretation existed, then the provision had to be struck down. 97

1. Categories of Private Speech
The Federal Circuit rejected the government’s argument that trademarks
were purely commercial speech. 98 While trademarks are used in commerce as
a means of communicating information about the seller, the product, and the
price to customers, they can also convey “powerful messages” unrelated to the
source-identifying function. 99 The Federal Circuit found that such an ability
made trademarks expressive speech, which required it to analyze the immoralscandalous bar under strict scrutiny. 100 By the government’s own concession,
§ 2(a)’s bar on immoral and scandalous marks could not survive such scrutiny
and thus the restriction was unconstitutional. 101
Despite this conclusion, the Federal Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny
to show that even if trademarks were commercial speech, § 2(a) was unconstitutional. 102 The Federal Circuit applied the four-part test outlined in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York 103
for determining whether there is a substantial governmental interest. 104 The
test involved determining “whether (1) the speech concerns lawful activity and
is not misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1337–40.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1342–49.
Id. at 1342–48.
Id. at 1348–50.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id. at 1348–49.
Id. (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017)).
Id. at 1349.
Id.
Id. at 1350–55.
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1350.
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regulation directly advances that government interest; and (4) . . . the regulation
is ‘not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.’” 105
The Federal Circuit found that neither the second, the third, nor the fourth
requirements were met. 106 With regard to the second requirement, the Federal
Circuit found that the government’s interest in suppressing speech merely because it offends society was not substantial because it was contrary to the
“‘bedrock First Amendment principle’ that ‘[s]peech may not be banned on the
ground that it expresses ideas that offend.’” 107 The third requirement was not
met because prohibiting registration of the mark would not suppress speech
due to the fact that, regardless of whether he had a federally registered trademark, Brunetti could use “FUCT” on his clothing. 108 Finally, the fourth requirement was deemed not to have been met because the USPTO’s inconsistent
application of the provision undermined the likelihood the provision was narrowly tailored. 109 Because all four requirements of the test were not satisfied,
the Federal Circuit concluded the immoral-scandalous provision did not survive either intermediate or strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional. 110
The majority also briefly addressed the concurring opinion’s argument
that the provision could be saved by narrowing it to bar only the registration of
obscene marks. 111 It concluded the definitions of “immoral” and “scandalous”
were so far removed from the definition of “obscene” that to construe the provision to prohibit only the registration of obscene marks would usurp the power
of the legislature. 112

2. Forum Analysis
The Federal Circuit then considered the issue of whether trademark registration was a limited public forum, 113 which would allow for intermediate
scrutiny of the immoral-scandalous bar, regardless of whether trademarks were
expressive speech. 114 The government contended that, like the student activity
fund in Rosenberger, 115 the principal register was a metaphysical limited public forum. 116 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that while
the United States Supreme Court has permitted some forums to be more “metaphysical” than “spatial or geographic,” they nonetheless had to be “tethered
105. Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980)).
106. Id. at 1350–54.
107. Id. at 1351 (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017)).
108. Id. at 1353.
109. Id. at 1353–54 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997)).
110. Id. at 1355, 1357.
111. Id. at 1355.
112. Id. at 1356–57.
113. Id. at 1345.
114. See id. at 1346.
115. See discussion of Rosenberger supra note 44.
116. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1346–47.
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to government properties.” 117 Trademarks, which are owned and used by private entities, do not share this attribute. 118 Trademarks are not connected to
government properties but instead “make up part of the expression of everyday
life.” 119 As such, the Federal Circuit held restricting speech would “chill
speech anywhere from the Internet to the grocery store” and restrict speech in
areas far beyond those owned by the government. 120 The Federal Circuit further found the mere placement of registered trademarks on the principal register was insufficient to transform trademark registration into a limited public
forum because the principal register simply functions as a “database” and is
ancillary to trademark registration. 121

3. Funding Restrictions
The Federal Circuit rejected the government’s argument that trademarks
were a form of government subsidy program that would entitle the restriction
on speech to intermediate scrutiny. 122 According to the government subsidy
framework articulated in Agency for International Development, attaching conditions to government funds, including those which are apparent restrictions on
speech, is constitutional so long as the restrictions define the contours of the
subsidy program rather than seek to regulate speech. 123 Trademark registration, however, neither implicated Congress’ spending power nor functioned as
a “subsidy equivalent.” 124 When registering a mark, the applicant pays the
USPTO, not vice versa, and private rather than federal funding is involved in
the transaction. 125 Although the USPTO does use federal funds, they are only
“tangentially” involved with trademark registration. 126 Thus, the court held
“[t]he government’s involvement in processing and issuing trademarks does
not transform trademark registration into a government subsidy.” 127

4. Saving Interpretation
Referencing a canon of statutory construction that statutes should be construed so as to preserve their constitutionality whenever possible, the Federal

117. See id. at 1347 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 830 (1995)).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1348.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1345.
123. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214–15
(2013).
124. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1344.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Circuit also considered other potential interpretations of § 2(a). 128 Ultimately,
it concluded no reasonable interpretation of the statute would survive strict
scrutiny 129 and it struck down the bar against registering immoral or scandalous
trademarks. 130
The majority disagreed with the concurrence’s contention that “immoral”
and “obscene” should be given the same definition in order to create an interpretation of the provision that would preserve its constitutionality. 131 It stated
the United States Supreme Court made it clear obscenity only involves that
“which deals with sex” and that of the dictionaries cited by the concurrence
define either “immoral” or “scandalous” in sexual terms. 132 Because “immoral” and “scandalous” lack an explicitly sexual definition, the majority held
the immoral-scandalous provision bars substantively different material than
what would be covered by a bar on obscenity. 133 Additionally, the majority
held to construe the provision in the manner suggested by the concurring opinion would be to rewrite the provision rather than narrow it and would usurp the
power of the legislature. 134

B. The Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Judge Timothy B. Dyk agreed that the majority
reached the correct decision with regard to Brunetti and that the immoral-scandalous provision was constitutionally problematic. 135 He disagreed, however,
with the majority’s finding that there was no constitutional construction that
could save the provision from invalidation. 136 Judge Dyk emphasized the duty
of courts to, “where possible, construe federal statutes so as to avoid serious
doubt of their constitutionality.” 137 Because of this duty, he would have construed the statute to bar only marks that are obscene rather than strike down the
provision in its entirety. 138
Judge Dyk argued that a constitutional construction of the immoral-scandalous provision could be reached by reading it, in light of obscenity case law,
to prohibit only the registration of obscene marks. 139 He contended that dictionaries from the time of the 1905 enactment of the immoral-scandalous provision list “immoral” as a synonym of “obscene” and that the two words should
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1356–57.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1358 (Dyk, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 477 (2011)).
Id.
Id. at 1358.
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be given the same meaning. 140 Because interpreting the immoral-scandalous
provision to prohibit only the registration of obscene marks would provide a
constitutional construction, Judge Dyk argued the Federal Circuit was obliged
to adopt that construction rather than invalidate the provision entirely. 141 Judge
Dyk nevertheless concurred in the result because there was “no suggestion that
[FUCT was] obscene” and therefore the mark was registrable regardless. 142

V. COMMENT
The majority erred in invalidating the immoral-scandalous provision. As
indicated in Judge Dyk’s concurring opinion, the immoral-scandalous provision should have been narrowed rather than invalidated. As explained below,
the rest of § 2(a) should be safe from a challenge on First Amendment grounds.

A. The Immoral-Scandalous Provision Should Have Been Narrowed
The majority’s invalidation of the immoral-scandalous provision was
premature. Both the majority and concurring opinions acknowledged that
courts have a duty to attempt to find a reasonable construction of a statute in
order to prevent its invalidation. 143 The majority, however, asserted two primary arguments for refusing to narrow the statute. 144 First, it argued that the
definitions of “immoral” and “scandalous” are fundamentally different from
that of “obscene.” 145 Second, it stated that limiting the immoral-scandalous
provision to only bar the registration of scandalous materials would effectively
usurp the legislature’s power because such a construction would effectively
rewrite the statute to take on a definition not intended by the legislature. 146
The majority takes an unnecessarily literal view of the definitions of immoral, scandalous, and obscene. While none of the definitions cited by the
majority define “immoral” or “scandalous” in explicitly sexual terms, 147 a nuanced view of the definitions includes references to sex. The definitions cited
by the majority define immoral as “not moral” or “contrary to good morals.” 148
The United States Supreme Court has frequently considered morality-based
legislation concerning sexual matters. 149 Such cases reveal that morality, and
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1359–60.
Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1358, 1360.
Id. at 1355–57 (majority).
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 1356–57.
Id. at 1356.
Id.
See generally, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a
law prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse” between two persons of the same sex); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a law prohibiting any abortion except “by
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therefore immorality, can involve that which deals with sex and can therefore
involve obscenity.
The distinction drawn by the majority attempts to completely separate
that which is immoral or scandalous from that which is obscene and ignores
the fundamental interconnectedness of the two concepts. The majority
acknowledges that “[t]here is no dispute that an obscene mark would be scandalous or immoral . . . .” 150 If the concepts were truly separate, as the majority
indicates, then such a result would not occur. Despite that fact, the majority
still refused to construe the statute simply because “not all scandalous or immoral marks are obscene.” 151 Such logic is flawed. Obscene marks are simply
a subset of immoral or scandalous marks; that is, the definition of an immoral
or scandalous mark naturally encompasses that which is obscene.
Because obscene marks are a subset of immoral or scandalous marks, the
majority was incorrect in stating that narrowing the statute would usurp the
legislative power. While the majority was correct in stating that giving an entirely new definition to a statute would usurp the legislative power, it failed to
recognize that immoral and scandalous can be read as obscene. Thus, the concurrence proposed a reasonable construction that must be adopted rather than
an unreasonable usurpation of the legislature. Essentially, the concurrence proposed pruning rather than rewriting and therefore was correct in stating the
statute should be narrowed rather than invalidated.
Because a reasonable construction of the statute exists and is sufficient to
preserve the statute’s constitutionality, and because a court must not strike
down a statute as unconstitutional if a reasonable construction exists, 152 the
majority erred in finding the immoral-scandalous provision unconstitutional.
The concurring opinion was correct in its analysis and conclusion that the provision should be narrowed in scope rather than struck down.

B. The Remainder of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act Is Safe from FirstAmendment Challenge
After the Tam and Brunetti decisions, two of the five statutory bars of §
2(a) remain: (1) the bar on deceptive marks and (2) the bar on marks that falsely
suggest a connection with a person. 153 Both provisions can withstand strict
scrutiny and are safe from a First Amendment challenge.
The government has a compelling interest in preventing the registration
of deceptive trademarks. The fundamental purpose of trademarks is to be used
by consumers in commerce to identify and distinguish their goods from the
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut law imposing punishment on
those who uses contraceptives).
150. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1355.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1358 (Dyk, J., concurring).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018).
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goods of others. 154 Deceptive marks obfuscate the source of goods and make
it harder for consumers to distinguish the goods they wish to purchase from
those they deem inferior. The narrowly tailored requirement is also satisfied
because the provision only prevents the registration of marks that are deceptive.
The compelling interest supporting the bar on falsely suggestive marks is
similar to, but slightly weaker than, that of the interest supporting the bar on
deceptive marks. Marks that falsely suggest a connection with a person make
it difficult for consumers to identify the source of a good and, consequently,
frustrate the source-identifying function of a trademark. There is a compelling
interest in preventing this type of confusion. Unlike deceptive marks, however,
there is a greater possibility the mark would not actually cause confusion because consumers would see through the false connection. Another possibility
is that this type of confusion would be more easily remedied by adding a disclaimer to the product than would a product sold under a deceptive mark. Despite these possibilities, it is still likely that preserving the source-identifying
function would be deemed a sufficiently compelling interest to survive scrutiny. By only prohibiting trademarks that falsely suggest a connection, the prohibition is narrowly tailored.
Because the two remaining provisions are capable of surviving strict scrutiny, it is likely that they are safe from First Amendment challenge.

VI. CONCLUSION
In In re Brunetti, the Federal Circuit invalidated the immoral-scandalous
provision on the ground that it conflicted with the First Amendment, which
allowed the mark FUCT to be registered. 155 While allowing FUCT to be registered was proper, the majority erred in concluding there was no reasonable
interpretation of the immoral-scandalous provision that could preserve its constitutionality. It is improper to prevent the registration of marks that are merely
“immoral” or “scandalous,” but First Amendment jurisprudence indicates it
would proper to narrow the bar to prevent only the subset of immoral or scandalous marks that are also obscene. Because courts have a duty to preserve the
constitutionality of a statute unless there is no reasonable interpretation, 156 the
majority failed its duty when it rejected a rational interpretation of the immoralscandalous provision. The concurring opinion, which suggested preserving the
statute by limiting its reach to obscene marks, 157 had the correct analysis of the
case.
With the immoral-scandalous and disparagement provisions deemed unconstitutional, only two portions of § 2(a) remain. 158 Both remaining provisions, however, have a compelling interest that the immoral-scandalous and
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. § 1127.
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357.
See id. at 1358 (Dyk, J., concurring).
Id. at 1357–61.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
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disparagement provisions were lacking – an interest in preserving the source
identification function of trademarks. Both are also narrowly tailored and capable of withstanding strict scrutiny. The remaining provisions are likely safe
from First Amendment challenge, which means that while the disparagement
and immoral-scandalous provisions are FUCT, the remaining provisions almost certainly are not.
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